A “Dream Thailand” Public Forum on:
“Asia’s New ‘Boat People’ Crisis: Regionalization, Regulation, Regionalism”
Tuesday, 9th June 2015 at 08.30 – 11.30 a.m.
The Chumbhot-Pantip Conference Room, 4th Floor, Prajadhipok-Rambhaibarni Building,
Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University
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Programme
08.30 – 9.00 a.m. Registration and Coffee
09.00 – 09:10 a.m. Opening Remarks
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ake Tangsupvattana
Dean, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University
09.10 – 10:50 a.m. Speakers
Mr. Jeffrey Labovitz
Chief of Mission
International Organiozation for Migration (IOM Bangkok)
Dr. Kasira Cheeppensook
Department of International Relations
Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University
Mr. Kavi Chongkittavorn
Senior Fellow, ISIS Thailand
H. E. Mr. Kasit Piromya
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs
Kingsom of Thailand
Ms. Gwen Robinson
Chief Editor, Mikkei Asain Review
Senior Fellow, ISIS Thailand
Moderator:
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Thitinan Pongsudhirak
Director, ISIS Thailand
Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University
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Videos - Asia s New "Boat People" Crisis: Regionalization, Regulation, Regionalism
Asia s New "Boat People" Crisis: Regionalization, Regulation, Regionalism 1/3: www.youtube.com/watch
Asia s New "Boat People" Crisis: Regionalization, Regulation, Regionalism 2/3: www.youtube.com/watch
Asia s New "Boat People" Crisis: Regionalization, Regulation, Regionalism 3/3: www.youtube.com/watch
If you wish more detailed information concerning this seminar please click
http://www.facebook.com/ISISThailand
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Introductory Remarks: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ake Tangsupvattana
Thousands of “boat people” have been journeying from the Bay of Bengal eastward, aiming primarily for Malaysia
and Indonesia. They seek jobs, to improve their livelihoods, and to escape persecution and poverty in the region of
their origination. This is an issue that has become regionalized, but without an adequate framework for its handling
or resolution. It is just not limited to the region, however; this poses challenges for the entire international community.
Some progress was made at the 29 May meeting in Bangkok, especially with Malaysia and Indonesia committing to
provide shelter for a year. Although things seem to be going in the right direction, much more is needed.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak: The title of this forum is very broad; it will be noticed that we settled on the term
“new boat-people crisis,” and that the words “Rohingya” and “migrant” were not used. This is an issue that
crosses borders, involving South Asia as well as Southeast Asia. It also involves “nontraditional” security
concerns for the states in question. With the meeting on 29 May, several observations could be made: First,
Thailand’s role is that of a transit country for the migrants. Second, the word “Rohingya” was not used.
Additionally, Bangladesh received much international attention and clearly has some responsibility. Of a group
of migrants discovered in Aceh, approximately 60% were Bangladeshi nationals. The IOM deals with people
and with migrants… What’s next?
Jeffrey Labovitz
It is noteworthy that this topic could not be discussed so publicly just one month ago. With the events of 29 May,
this is now possible.
The phenomenon that we are witnessing is not new; it has been happening for more than a decade, with
1,000-2,000 usually making the journey annually. The change came in 2012 and was a drastic one of scale. Now,
the numbers are closer to 10,000, and there were 5,000 in April 2015 alone. With the recent crackdown, however,
the numbers will now be dwindling.
Regionalization has been occurring in that the “boat people” include not only Rohingya out of Myanmar, but also
Bangladeshis, and they are also ending up in a variety of countries, including the UAE and Saudi Arabia, latter
of which has approximately half a million. Thailand itself may have up to 10,000, and there are now more Rohingya
outside of Rakhine state than within it. Regulation comes into play in terms of being possibly effective with
regard to economic migrants from Bangladesh, and also in the form of the recent crackdown. The larger boats have
now become too conspicuous, but we could start to see in 4-6 months smaller boats making the trip. The large
numbers that have been seen recently will never again be reached, however. Regional cooperation has been
occurring in that states are now communicating with one another hereon. Previously, there had been no effort to
assist the “boat people”, but lives must come first, and regulation can be effective in this area. The 29 May meeting
brought people together, and it was a success, because people actually talked about the issue. It is not, though,
going to be solved in one meeting; there needs to be a follow-up mechanism, which was not clearly defined.
The ASEAN processes, moreover, have not helped to solve the issue.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak: How many people can fit onto a single boat, and how much do they pay?
Jeffrey Labovitz
Three years ago, the boats were smaller, but they have been getting larger each year. An up-front fee approximately
of a few hundred USD is taken, and the boats depart once they have filled their quotas. The largest boats take
more than one thousand, who then have little food. Humans become just cargo. The journey lasts for a few weeks,
after which they arrive ashore and move to camps. 40% of those found in the camps were malnourished, 4%
severely so, and 1.9% on the verge of death. This often occurs with those who stop making payments to the traffickers
and thus stay in the camps longer.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak: Also, of course, mass graves have been found… Now, how would we assess the positions
of Thailand and of ASEAN?
Kavi Chongkittavorn
What comes next should be more meetings, but they ought to be higher-level. Thailand is a frontline state. With the 29
May meeting, it performed well, though the Minister of Foreign Affairs should have talked to the media. Previously,
the crisis had been regarded as an “internal” problem of other states, but it has since been acknowledged that it
is actually a regional one now. Even Myanmar realized this, and that is why they attended. Thailand asserts now zero
tolerance for human trafficking and will adapt its law-enforcement procedures; even if this was due in large part to
external pressure and a desire to gain more international legitimacy (especially vis-à-vis the U.S.), it is still a positive
development. Thailand is showing that it is facilitating and being more coordinated. (We do need to wait until
John Kerry’s remarks on 23 June, however.) It is also good that Myanmar is more willing to talk now. Thailand’s
next step should be to push this onto ASEAN’s agenda, but this would happen incrementally. What happens
in Malaysia, furthermore, will depend heavily on domestic-political concerns there. Previous attempts to work
through ASEAN failed, but now is the time for ASEAN to take the lead.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak: We will move the discussion now to Myanmar, and the limited success of
trying to talk to “Burma” about the “Rohingya”…
Gwen Robinson
I have gone to Rakhine state, and to the camps there. What is salient there is the sentiment against Muslims in
general, and not just the “Rohingya.” It is also clear that this crisis concerning a particular stateless people
with no governmental recognition is currently the biggest diplomatic challenge facing ASEAN and
Southeast Asia as a region. Among the “boat people,” there were previously no Bangladeshis, but, now, there
are varying proportions on each boatload. In the end, though, all of them need help.
On the diplomatic side, the 29 May meeting was a success, but this is a defining crisis for ASEAN. It brings
forth numerous underlying issues and tensions (noninterference, religion, security, migration), and we have
seen a lot of buck-passing and finger-pointing (such as that from Malaysia and Indonesia against their Buddhist
neighbors to the north). The Thai-Malaysian border has been tightened, resulting in economic fallout. It also
has implications for the AEC and Malaysia’s TPP negotiations (because of stipulations on human-trafficking).
The upcoming election in Myanmar will be crucial, though, and excessive international criticism could be disruptive.
Individuals with political aspirations cannot take any substantial course of action that would not have political
implications. Moreover, the antagonistic sentiment against the Rohingya is quite universal among the people of
Myanmar. What happens with them, though, will very much depend on the results of the election.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak: Domestic politics are also a concern in Thailand, though…and what of Bangladesh?
They are not part of ASEAN, so how will ASEAN deal with them?
Kasit Piromya
The 29 May meeting was officially among representatives from the five “most-affected” states, with regard to
the crisis, but this is wrong! Myanmar is not an “affected” state; it is the cause and origin of the crisis. There
was not, however, any discussion on Myanmar’s responsibility as such. Myanmar must solve its own problem.
There are two points that establish Myanmar’s responsibility. The first is its status as the successor state to that which
existed when the issues allegedly originated. The second is that, when border demarcation was negotiated with India,
there was no attempt to have the latter repatriate the Rohingya. Rather, Myanmar seemed to accept the Rohingya. Since
that time, though, Myanmar has come to list only 135 official nationalities leaving out the Rohingya, but this was
decided undemocratically, by military decree.
The international community must continue to pressure Myanmar. The Rohingya have the right to citizenship,
and Myanmar should not export its problems. I am also deeply disappointed with the silence of Aung San Suu Kyi
on this issue, especially as a Nobel Peace Prize recipient; is she to be world figure, or just a politician? I am also
very disappointed with the UN, and also the IOM, for not being at the forefront of this. Historically, the UN’s
track record in Southeast Asia has been much better; it affirmed states’ responsibilities. The UN could involve
itself more with resettlement and engage more with Myanmar especially on issues of development and education,
and to help the Rakhine Buddhists.
The 29 May meeting was just a showcase; the reality on the ground is much different. Thailand is closing one eye,
and there is too much attention to what is happening at sea. On land, there is slavery and torture. The Muslim chief
of Thailand made a proposal to help the Rohingya, but there was no response from the government. The Rohingya
need, however, the sensitivities of their fellow Muslims. The 29 May meeting was not enough.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak: You have essentially confined the problem to the Rohingya, though.
Kasit Piromya
This must be verified, but I believe that the “Bengalis” among the boat people are actually Rohingya who started
their journey from Bangladesh
Thitinan Pongsudhirak: At any rate, thank you for reminding us of the historical context.
We will now focus on the ASEAN dimension. With the discovery of the mass graves, this issue has come
into the public eye, and ASEAN is now in a quandary. There has since been a chain reaction of peer
pressure, and ASEAN would lose tremendous face by not reacting. It shows how ASEAN works and does not work.
Kasira Cheeppensook
The issues of regionalization, regulation, and regionalism are all intertwined. The aspects of regionalization and
regionalism both require that there be regulation, as there are now few legally binding mechanisms. Nonetheless,
there has been a norm-shift in ASEAN.
The crisis has shifted from one of internally displaced persons to one of irregular migration. After the 29 May
meeting, means of solving the crisis were divided into three areas providing humanitarian assistance, combating |